I started this series with two moral arguments that stemmed from a well known legal case. One argument rejected as wrong Dr Arthur's prescribing of dihydrocodeine and "nursing care only" for a rejected newborn infant with Down's syndrome and the other defended what he did as right. Seeking to show the complexity of reasoning that should underlie the conclusions "he was right" or "he was wrong," I extracted many moral claims and assumptions made in each argument. In the subsequent 24 articles I analysed many of these. What, if any light can such analyses shed on those opposing arguments about the Arthur case? The first point is that these issues are exceedingly complex. Next it should be clear that rational arguments for each side of this case can be mounted by sincere people anxious to come to right conclusions. Thus it is inappropriate to assume stupidity, ignorance, or ill intent in those who reach opposing conclusions to one's own in medicomoral argu- ments.
An approach to moral dilemmas
In medicomoral dilemmas I have suggested looking at the relevance of the four principles outlined by Beauchamp 544 unless they confront a particular medicomoral problem in their practice-for example, abortion-they do not need to bother too much about the moral arguments concerning it. But is it not obvious that any doctor who ever accepts the moral legitimacy of abortion as a bona fide medical practice-and most do-really needs to work out why he can justify abortion but meant by "a person" and "people" in this context is inadequately worked out and a subject of vigorous philosophical debate. One line of argument is that a necessary condition for being a person, and thus for being owed the moral respect due to persons, including an intrinsic (though prima facie) moral right not to be intentionally killed by others, is awareness of oneself or selfconsciousness. (This line ofargument stems from a discussion about the nature ofpersons by the physician-philosopher John Locke.4) It seems plausible that the morally special attributes that distinguish people from animals and other entities to which we do not accord an intrinsic right to life require a capacity for self consciousness. According to this argument self consciousness is not morally important in itself but is a necessary condition of all the remarkable and distinguishing characteristics that endow people with special moral importance and thus special moral rights. This argument supposes that all newborn infants, like all fetuses, are not selfconscious and therefore cannot be people and therefore do not have an-intrinsic moral right to life. Clearly part of the argument rests on empirical claims and requires appropriate empirical support, but there seems little doubt that newly fertilised ova are not self conscious and equally little doubt that adults are, therefore somewhere along the developmental line, perhaps gradually rather than suddenly, self consciousness must develop.
The right to life and newborn infants
Of course, even if this argument were accepted it does not imply that fetuses and babies should not in most cases be carefully protected. There are several justifications for such protection other than an intrinsic right to life. The first is that the development from newly fertilised ovum to self conscious human being 'is gradual, and there are plausible consequentialist reasons for reflecting such development by according gradually increasing moral protection to the developing embryo, fetus, and newly born infant. Secondly, in most cases mothers, fathers, families, apd societies put enormous value on newly born babies-much greater value than, in our society, they typically put on the embryo and fetus-and thus there are important consequentialist reasons for reflecting this distinction in our social institutions. Thirdly, in most cases great personal and social anguish and disruption would result ifnewly born babies were not given very careful protection, especially by doctors.
None the less, if it is true that newly born infants have not yet developed into people and therefore do not yet have the full moral rights of people, including the "right to life," then it becomes justifiable for-societies to determine that in certain circumstances the protection that should normally be extended to newly born infants may be withdrawn. In cases where an intrinsic right to life did not exist to function as a moral "trump card" such circumstances would be determined by considerations of overall harm and benefit, which took into account both the moral repuguance normally evinced at infanticide and also the harm to families and society of keeping alive unwanted severely handicapped infants. Given the great social disagreement over these issues it would, of course, be intolerable-even in merely consequentialist terms-to impose any such withdrawal of protection or "allowing to die." If the parents of severely handicapped newborn infants want them tobe medically sustained then their wishes should if possible be respected-but if, having,considered the matter, the parents want the infant to be painlessly "allowed to die" then according to this argument their wishes too can legitimately be respected.
The question of acts and omissions
Many doctors would support active "allowing to die" of the sort carried out by Dr Arthur but would'reject any active killing of such; infants. I believe I have shown that itis difficult to justify even active "allowing to die" unless it is also agreed that severely handicapped newborn infants are not owed the same moral duties, especially the duty to preserve their lives, that doctors owe to their patients in general. I have also argued previously, however, against the customary medical assumption that the distinction between acts and omissions can justify a moral distinction between withdrawal of medical treatment and active killing. A moral question has to be answered first-namely, which medical acts and omissions to act are morally justifiable and which are not? Knowingly causing conditions in which an infant is likely to die when it is otherwise unlikely to do so, and where there is no intention of benefiting the infant by doing so, is normally regarded as morally culpable, as murder or manslaughter. The father who killed baby Brown, also an infant with Down's syndrome, was jailed for manslaughter. What are the morally important differences between what he did and what Dr Arthur did?s 6 There is no reason to suppose that the verdict on baby Brown's father would have been ameliorated had his baby died because the father gave dihydrocodeine, fed and hydrated it only on demand, and then did not obtain medical care when it became ill. Such treatment could only be justified if(a) the newborn infant, like the fetus, does not have an intrinsic right to life and (b) there is -sufficient justification in terms of overall benefit over harm (in this context restriction of such treatments to doctors and parents acting together may help to minimise the harm).
A radical challenge
Here, then, is a radical challenge to those who would support Dr Arthur's action. If they believe that they owe the same duty to respect the lives of newborn infants with Down's syndrome as they owe to all their other patients how do they justify their support of actions that they would alnost certainly reject in older patients with Down's syndrome? (And ifthey also defend abortion-for example, of fetuses with Down's syndrome-how do they justify their different attitudes to the fetus and to the newborn infant?) If, on the other hand, they believe that they do not owe the same duty to newborn infants with Down's syndrome that they owe to their other patients, how do they justify this position without falling into the trap of denying all patients with Down's syndrome the moral protection they afford to their patients in general? I believe that the issue turns on the question of personhood and that it is because the newly born infant is not a person that it is justifiable in cases of severe handicap to "allow it to die" in the way Dr Arthur allowed baby Pearson to die. But while there may be some social.benefits in distinguishing between actively "allowing to die" and painlessly killing such infants, there is, I believe, no other moral difference, and doctors who accept such "allowing to die" 'of severely handicapped newborn infants should not deceive themselves into believing that there is such a difference. Those who do not accept these radical claims-yet wish to support action like Dr Arthur's need to cudgel their brains for a rationale, one that is consistent with their attitudes to abortion, the "morning after pill" embryo research, and the treatment of newborn infants with spina bifida or anencephaly, of patients with severe .dementia, of patients in persistent vegetative state, and of those with "brain stem death." Such are the widespread ramifications of questions about the scope of our moral obligations to human beings at different stages of their lives.
